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COUNTERACTING DIMINISHED PRIVACY IN AN
AUGMENTED REALITY: PROTECTING
GEOLOCATION PRIVACY
Diana Martinez*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you own a house on a quiet street in Maryland. Upon
driving home from work one day, you notice a large group of
strangers—children, teenagers, and adults alike—congregated at the
park across the street. Upon further investigation, you notice a
common pattern in behavior: each stranger walks around the park
holding his or her smartphone and swipes upwards on the screen.
Rather than ask the strangers about their motives, you leave them to
their devices in hopes that this occurrence is an anomaly. This
occurrence, however, becomes universal overnight. The next day, you
see crowds of seemingly antisocial strangers exhibiting the same
pattern of behavior everywhere: the grocery store, the fountain placed
outside the museum, and even your neighbor’s lawn. This unusual yet
ubiquitous behavior is attributed to the mobile application game
known as Pokémon Go.
Developed and created by Niantic, Inc., the object of the game is
to collect virtual creatures by visiting locations in the real world,
training creatures, and battling other players’ creatures. By tracking
the player’s geolocation, the application provides a geographic view
of nearby locations that are fertile for collecting and battling creatures.
The technology underlying Pokémon Go is augmented reality
(“AR”) and operates in three steps. An individual end user collects
information about the physical world through an application on his or
her device, such as a smartphone or tablet. Next, the application sends
* J.D. Candidate, May 2018, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Psychology,
Neuroscience and Behavior (Music Cognition Specialization), McMaster University. I would like
to thank Professor John Nockleby for his guidance, patience, and encouragement throughout the
law review process. Most importantly, I would like to thank my parents, Don and Clemencia, for
their unwavering love and support.
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the information to a computer linked to the application’s network,
which modifies the information. The computer sends the modified
information back to the end user and superimposes this information on
the device as though it is inherently part of the physical world.1
Applying these steps to the first phase of Pokémon Go, first, a
player enables the application to collect the smartphone’s geolocation
information from the physical world. The application then sends the
geolocation information to a computer in Niantic, Inc.’s network to
determine which virtual creatures are available for collection at nearby
locations. Lastly, the computer sends this information back to the
application and superimposes an image of the virtual creature on the
user’s screen as though it were part of the real world. Because
gameplay is entirely based on the geolocation of the player’s device,
Niantic, Inc. necessarily collects, stores, and may disclose this
information to third parties.2 Therefore, the main privacy concern with
Pokémon Go is Niantic, Inc.’s unregulated practices involving the
player’s geolocation information.3
In the United States, individuals are clearly protected from
privacy intrusions by the government.4 In contrast, end users may seek
redress from non-government entities, such as technology
corporations and mobile application developers, only under certain
circumstances.5 Currently, there is no federal or state legislation that
expressly protects an end user’s geolocation privacy from
non-government entities. Because of this legislative gap, Niantic, Inc.
may freely collect, store, and disclose a player’s geolocation
information for unspecified purposes without the end user’s consent.
The Location Privacy Protection Act (“LPPA”) is a federal bill
that proposes to bridge this gap by prohibiting a non-government
entity from collecting or disclosing an end user’s geolocation
information without consent. This Note critiques the proposed bill on
1. See infra Part II.A.
2. Pokémon GO Privacy Policy, NIANTIC, INC. 4–5, https://www.nianticlabs.com/privacy
/pokemongo/en (last visited Dec. 21, 2016).
3. See infra Part II.B.2.
4. See United States v. Jones, 556 U.S. 400 (2012).
5. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–79 (2008) (privacy violations arise where
non-government entities do not notify California residents that they collect or disclose information
such as social security numbers, but not the resident’s geolocation information); In re Nickelodeon
Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 287–89 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that there was no privacy
violation under the Video Privacy Protection Act because an IP address does not personally identify
the end user).
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the basis that it fails to regulate non-government entities’ storage
practices, and recommends legislative amendments. Part II describes
augmented reality, its application to Pokémon Go, and the surrounding
data privacy concerns. Part III introduces the framework of data
privacy law in the U.S. and highlights the difference in privacy actions
against the government and non-government entities. Part IV focuses
on the privacy issues associated with geolocation information and the
governing federal statute. Part V interprets the relevant provisions
from the proposed LPPA, identifies legislative gaps, and recommends
appropriate amendments in light of privacy and policy concerns.
Lastly, Part VI recapitulates the privacy issue posed by Pokémon Go,
and the importance of the proposed Act and the recommended
legislative amendments.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
A. Augmented Reality
In today’s world, completing mundane tasks often involves using
a device, such as a computer or smartphone. For example, obtaining
driving directions from the Google Maps website involves turning on
the computer, logging in, opening the web browser, entering the
Google Maps website, and typing in the respective address fields.
Similarly, using the Google Maps smartphone application involves
unlocking the smartphone, tapping the Google Maps icon, and typing
in the address fields. In both scenarios, the device—the computer or
the smartphone—acts as an intermediary between the end user and the
information.
Augmented reality (“AR”) eliminates the need for an
intermediary device by merging information from the digital world
with the user’s device from the physical world.6 For example, through
the camera of the user’s device, the IKEA application catalogue allows
the user to view a potential piece of furniture (e.g., a couch)
superimposed in a desired room (e.g., a living room),7 thereby merging
the furniture from the digital world with the actual room from the

6. See Andreas Kotsios, Privacy in an Augmented Reality, 23 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 157,
157–58 (2015).
7. Paul Ridden, IKEA Catalog Uses Augmented Reality to Give a Virtual Preview of
Furniture in a Room, NEW ATLAS (Aug. 14, 2013), http://newatlas.com/ikea-augmented-realitycatalog-app/28703.
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physical world. The ability to directly superimpose digital information
on the physical world literally augments reality.8
The technology underlying AR is relatively simple. AR requires
an application on a particular device9 to gather information about the
physical world.10 This information is then relayed to a computer linked
to the application’s network, which then modifies the information and
sends back to the application.11 Using the modified information, the
application projects the information on the device’s camera as if it was
“overlaid onto the real world.”12
Because AR merges digital and physical information, this
technology conveys information to the user much faster than an
intermediary device, and is used subtly in a variety of contexts,
including sports,13 interior design,14 and education.15 AR has also been
adopted in wearable head devices, such as Google Glass, which
integrates information about a person or object viewed through the
glasses themselves.16 Most recently, AR has been applied to mobile
applications.17
B. Pokémon Go
Perhaps AR’s most controversial recent application is the mobile
application game developed by Niantic, Inc. (“Niantic”) known as
Pokémon Go.18 Before beginning gameplay, Niantic requires the
player to take a number of steps.19 Prospective players must sign up
using a Gmail, Facebook, or Pokémon Trainer Club account.20 After
signing up, the player must agree to Niantic’s Terms and Services,

8. Brian D. Wassom, IP in an Augmented Reality, 6 LANDSLIDE 8, 10 (2014).
9. Olivia Whitcroft, Augmented Reality—a Leap into a New World, 14 PRIVACY & DATA
PROTECTION 7 (2013).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Piazza v. Kirkbride, 785 S.E.2d 695, 699 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016) (“the yellow first-down
line that appears on screen during a televised football game.”).
14. See Ridden, supra note 7.
15. Anatomy Education Tools, SOFT INTERACTION LAB (July 10, 2016),
http://softinteraction.com/archives/1165.
16. See Kotsios, supra note 6.
17. See, e.g., Brandon Widder, The Twenty Best Augmented-Reality Apps, DIGITAL TRENDS
(Aug. 6, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/best-augmented-reality-apps.
18. NIANTIC, INC., supra note 2, at 1.
19. Id. at 2.
20. Id. at 1–2.
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including its privacy policy.21 The relevant provision of the policy
addresses Niantic’s data collection, storage, and disclosure practices:
Niantic collects geolocation information of the player’s smartphone
through “cell/mobile tower triangulation, wifi triangulation, and/or
GPS.”22 Additionally, Niantic reserves the right in perpetuity to store23
and disclose this information to third parties.24
A player can begin playing after signing up and accepting
Niantic’s Terms and Services. Gameplay occurs in three phases: (1)
collect virtual creatures from locations in the real-world environment,
(2) train creatures, and (3) battle another player’s creatures.25 As
described below, AR technology permeates each stage of the game.
1. Gameplay
First, a player must collect or catch a virtual creature, known as a
Pokémon.26 To collect Pokémon, the player must visit locations in the
real world environment, known as Pokéstops,27 which are fertile for
collecting Pokémon.28 As the player navigates the real world, the
underlying AR technology tracks the player’s device and provides a
map of nearby Pokéstops.29 Alternatively, the player can view the
physical world through the camera of the device (“camera mode”).
Once the player arrives at a Pokéstop, the application, through AR
technology, notifies the player that a Pokémon is available for
collection.30 Using camera mode, the player locates the Pokémon by
holding the device upwards and moving around the Pokéstop until the
three-dimensional creature appears on the screen of the device,
superimposed on the real world environment as though it were a
physical, tangible object.31 The player then captures the Pokémon by
swiping upwards on the screen to throw a Pokéball at the creature.32
21. See id. at 1.
22. Id. at 4.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 4–5.
25. Sam Haysom, A Beginner’s Guide: How to Play ‘Pokémon Go’, MASHABLE (July 22,
2016), http://mashable.com/2016/07/22/pokemon-go-beginners-guide/#irtcvbSGzmqE.
26. Serenity Caldwell et al., Beginner’s Guide: How to Play Pokémon Go!, IMORE (Nov. 19,
2016, 7:00 AM), http://www.imore.com/pokemon-go-beginners-guide.
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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After collecting the Pokémon, the player must prepare the
Pokémon for battle.33 This requires catching the same type of
Pokémon by navigating the real world as described above. Collecting
the same type of Pokémon enables the creature to evolve in its strength
and abilities.34
The final step of gameplay involves using the evolved Pokémon
to battle other players’ Pokémon at designated areas, known as
Gyms.35 Similar to locating Pokéstops, the application, through AR
technology, provides a geographic view of nearby Gyms based on the
location of the player’s device.36
2. Reactions
Pokémon Go has generated a variety of reactions from players,
third parties, politicians, and interest groups. Overall, players have
embraced Pokémon Go. In the United States, Pokémon Go was
released on July 6, 2016 and became the top grossing application
within thirteen hours.37 As of August 2016, the application attracted
twenty-one million users and four to five million downloads each
day.38 Touchtone Research attributed Pokémon Go’s instant success
to nostalgia among older players, the opportunity for player interaction
at Gyms, and the fact that the underlying AR technology requires the
player to navigate the real world.39
Private entities, however, have not been as receptive to the game.
Entities have complained that Niantic’s placement of Pokéstops and
Gyms on their properties has been disrespectful and disruptive.40 For
33. Id.
34. Pokémon Video Games, POKÉMON, http://www.pokemon.com/us/pokemon-videogames/pokemon-go (last visited Nov. 8, 2016).
35. See Caldwell, supra note 26.
36. Id.
37. Jacob Siegal, All the Crazy Stats About Pokémon Go Collected on a Single Infographic,
BGR (Aug. 4, 2016, 8:00 PM), http://bgr.com/2016/08/04/all-the-crazy-stats-about-pokemon-gocollected-on-a-single-infographic.
38. Id.
39. Rich Foreman, Four Reasons Behind Pokémon Go’s Wild Success, STARTUP GRIND (Jul.
2016),
https://www.startupgrind.com/blog/4-reasons-behind-pokemon-gos-wild-success/;
Caroline Praderio, The Simple Reason Pokémon Go is so Insanely Successful, INSIDER (Jul. 11,
2016, 10:25 AM), http://www.thisisinsider.com/the-simple-reason-pokemon-go-is-so-successful2016-7.
40. Tim Mulkerin, You Officially Can’t Play Pokémon Go at the Hiroshima Memorial or the
Holocaust
Museum,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Aug.
9,
2016,
11:33
AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/pokemon-go-pokestops-removed-from-hiroshima-memorial-andholocaust-museum-2016-8. Private homeowners have also complained about Niantic’s placement

[CORRECTED] (10)50.4_MARTINEZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

PROTECTING GEOLOCATION PRIVACY

3/13/19 6:18 PM

719

instance, Niantic placed Pokéstops and Gyms at both the U.S.
Holocaust Memorial Museum and the Hiroshima Peace Memorial
Museum.41 Upon request from the Museums’ respective officials,
however, Niantic removed these Pokémon hotspots.
Politicians and interest groups alike have expressed data privacy
concerns about the game. Because each phase of gameplay involves
the geolocation of the end user’s device, Niantic may use the
underlying AR technology to collect and disclose this information to
third parties. Approximately one week after Pokémon Go was
released, Minnesota Senator Al Franken expressed his concerns about
Niantic’s uninhibited access to all players’ Gmail accounts, along with
its collection and disclosure practices.42 Similarly, the Electronic
Privacy Information Center urged the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”)43 to investigate Niantic’s practices and ensure that Niantic
complied with legislation carved out for children under the age of
thirteen.44 While remaining silent on its geolocation information
collection and disclosure practices, Niantic assured Senator Franken
that it remedied the issue of accessing players’ Gmail accounts.45
Pokémon Go, and more generally AR, demonstrate the growing
concerns regarding a non-government entity’s ability to collect, store,
and disclose an end user’s information. These concerns are governed
by data privacy law.
of Pokéstops. In an ongoing class action suit against Niantic, plaintiffs alleged that Niantic caused
a nuisance by placing Pokémon hotspots on their private properties without consent, which attracted
crowds of Pokémon Go players. See Complaint at 1, Marder v. Niantic, Inc., 2016 WL 4073537
(N.D. Cal. 2016) (No. 3:16-cv-04300); Complaint at 8–9, Dodich v. Niantic, Inc., No. 3:16-cv04556 (N.D. Cal. Filed Aug. 10, 2016).
41. Mulkerin, supra note 40.
42. Letter from Al Franken, Senator, Dist. of Minn., to John Hancke, Chief Exec. Officer,
Niantic, Inc. (July 12, 2016), http://www.franken.senate.gov/files/letter/160712_PokemonGO.pdf.
Mirroring Senator Al Franken’s data security concerns along with other “social risks,” China has
banned Pokémon Go in part because it has also banned Google Maps, which is an integral
component of the smartphone game. David Jagneux, China Cites National Security as It Bans
Pokémon Go and Other AR Games, VENTURE BEAT (Jan. 15, 2017, 12:10 PM),
http://venturebeat.com/2017/01/15/china-cites-national-security-as-it-bans-pokemon-go-andother-ar-games.
43. The FTC is the primary federal agency that regulates non-government entities’ data
collection and sharing practices. See infra Part III.A.
44. Letter from Marc Rotenberg, President and Exec. Dir., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. et al. to
Edith
Ramirez,
Chairwoman,
Fed.
Trade
Comm’n
(July
22,
2016),
https://epic.org/privacy/ftc/FTC-letter-Pokemon-GO-07-22-2016.pdf.
45. Letter from Courtney Greene Power, Gen. Couns., Niantic, Inc., to Al Franken, Senator,
Dist. of Minn. (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.franken.senate.gov/files/documents
/160826NianticResponse.pdf.
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III. DATA PRIVACY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
As announced by Boston attorneys Samuel D. Warren and Louis
D. Brandeis in 1890, the touchstone of privacy law is “[t]hat the
individual shall have the full protection in person and in property. . .
[and has] the right to be let alone.”46 Over a century after Warren and
Brandeis imparted their wisdom, the legal system struggles to adapt to
novel notions of privacy, particularly in light of today’s digital
landscape. In the United States, data privacy law exclusively protects
the end user’s data, known as personally identifiable information
(“PII”).47 PII generally refers to information that may personally
identify the end user, such as social security numbers, passport
numbers, and first and last names.48 As a caveat, there is no universally
adopted definition of PII.49 Consequently, information may qualify as
PII only for certain statutes, in certain jurisdictions.50 The
inconsistency of what qualifies as PII is attributed to the fragmented
structure of data privacy law.
A. Structure of Data Privacy Law
In the United States, data privacy law is regulated at both the
federal and the state level.51 At the federal level, data is not uniformly
regulated, but instead, varies depending on the industry.52 Aside from
these industry-specific bodies, the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) is the main regulatory body.53 The FTC is primarily
responsible for protecting consumers from “[u]nfair methods of
46. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
47. 1 RAYMOND T. NIMMER & HOLLY K. TOWLE, DATA PRIVACY, PROTECTION, AND
SECURITY LAW § 2.01, at 8 (2017).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 4.
50. Compare Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 486 (1st Cir.
2016) (holding the end user’s GPS coordinates are PII in the context of the Video Privacy Protection
Act of 1988), with In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(holding the end user’s automatically generated geolocation information is not PII in the context of
the Wiretap Act).
51. Lisa J. Sotto & Aaron P. Simpson, United States, in DATA PROTECTION & PRIVACY 2015
208, 208 (Rosemary P. Jay ed., 2015), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/wp-content/uploads
/sites/18/2011/04/DDP2015_United_States.pdf.
52. Id. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services regulates healthcare
entities pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. HIPAA Enforcement,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/complianceenforcement (last visited Nov. 8, 2016).
53. Sotto & Simpson, supra note 51, at 208.
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competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.”54 In the context of data privacy
law, the FTC protects consumers by “enforcing companies’ privacy
policies.”55 Thus, it is clear that the FTC’s responsibilities are limited
to consumers, or end users, rather than the general public.56
Data privacy law is also regulated at the state level and varies
from state to state. At this level, the Attorney General has the authority
to enforce privacy laws.57 This discussion will focus on California, as
it is considered the model state for data privacy laws.58 California’s
recently enacted Electronic Communications Privacy Act limits the
government’s ability to collect and use a California resident’s
electronic communications for law enforcement purposes.59 The
Online Privacy Protection Act protects individuals’ privacy against
non-government entities by requiring website owners or operators to
give end users notice regarding the types of information they intend to
collect and/or disclose to third parties.60 Considering the FTC’s
purpose along with these California laws, data privacy law protects an
end user against both government and non-government entities.61
Furthermore, California’s laws naturally reveal two dichotomies: (1)
users and non-users, and (2) government and non-government entities.
B. The Government/Non-Government Dichotomy
To simplify privacy law, privacy actions can be divided into two
categories:(1) actions against the government, and (2) actions against
a non-government entity (“NGE”).62 This distinction is important
because it dictates the legal framework courts apply in resolving

54. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012).
55. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 585 (2014).
56. Id. (noting the dominant role the FTC plays in protecting an individual’s PII).
57. Sotto & Simpson, supra note 51, at 208.
58. Kim Zetter, California Now Has the Nation’s Best Digital Privacy Law, WIRED (Oct. 8,
2015, 9:58 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/california-now-nations-best-digital-privacy-law.
59. David Navetta et al., Five New Privacy Laws on Tap in California, NORTON ROSE
FULBRIGHT: DATA PROTECTION REP. (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.dataprotectionreport.com
/2015/10/five-new-privacy-laws-on-tap-in-california/. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546 (2016).
60. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–79 (2008).
61. Sotto & Simpson, supra note, 51 at 209–10.
62. Victoria Schwartz, Overcoming the Public-Private Divide in Privacy Analogies, 67
HASTINGS L.J. 143, 146 (2015). But see, Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1095 (2002) (“The government is
increasingly contracting with private sector entities to acquire databases of personal information.”).
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privacy actions.63 Courts apply the Fourth Amendment64 reasonable
expectation of privacy test65 for actions against the government.66
Courts do not apply the Fourth Amendment for privacy actions against
NGEs,67 but instead, rely on a variety of sources of law,68 including
federal statutes,69 state constitutions,70 state laws,71 and FTC
regulations.72
Professor Schwartz of Pepperdine University School of Law
offers four justifications for this dichotomy. First, the government is
traditionally more powerful than NGEs because of “a combination of
coercion, state power, and . . . monopoly features of government.”73
This coercive power is rooted in the government’s ability to deprive
the individual of life and liberty.74 Second, the government’s
surveillance abilities may instill fear in an individual, deter the
individual from making decisions that develop his or her identity, and
ultimately chill participation in the democratic system.75 Third, the
63. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 150; Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A
Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 298 (1983).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”).
65. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding the government conducted an
unreasonable search by wiretapping a telephone booth because the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy); see also id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (outlining a two-part expectation
of privacy test); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (stating that the reasonable expectation
of privacy test “has come to mean the test enunciated by Justice Harlan’s separate concurrence in
Katz.”).
66. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 150.
67. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (“[T]he private sector [is] a domain
unguarded by Fourth Amendment constraints.”); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113
(1984).
68. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 151.
69. See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–05 (2012).
70. See, e.g., Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 644 (Cal. 1994) (holding
the California constitution protects an individual’s right to privacy against both government and
non-government entities).
71. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 435 (2011) (“No [public or private] employer [except the
federal government] may cause an audio or video recording to be made of an employee in a
restroom, locker room, or room designated by an employer for changing clothes . . .”); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 637.7 (2016) (“No person or entity in this state shall use an electronic tracking device to
determine the location or movement of a person.”).
72. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 55, at 588 (“The FTC can bring an action against a company
for breaching a promise in its privacy policy—and, even more broadly, for any deceptive or unfair
act or practice.”).
73. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 174.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 176. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 1609, 1657 (1999) (“[L]imitless surveillance of expression in cyberspace . . . can corrupt
individual decision-making about the elements of one’s identity.”).
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government traditionally has better access to superior technology than
NGEs.76 Finally, the government faces bureaucratic pressures to
produce favorable results in the short-term without considering the
long-term effects.77 This is particularly salient for law enforcement,
where police forces are constantly pressured to protect the public by
arresting suspects in a short amount of time.78
Noting that courts often analogize between government and nongovernment cases without any basis, 79 Professor Schwartz developed
a framework for courts to use in deciding whether such analogies are
appropriate.80 The framework requires balancing the four
justifications that explain the government/NGE dichotomy.81 Thus, a
court resolving a privacy action against an NGE may analogize to
Fourth Amendment cases if the NGE exhibited coercive power,82 had
the ability to instill fear in an individual that amounts to potentially
chilling democratic participation,83 had better access to superior
technology,84 and faced similar bureaucratic pressures.85
76. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 178. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238
(1986) (“[I]t may well be, as the Government concedes, that surveillance of personal property by
using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, such as
satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.”).
77. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 180. See Adam Shinar, Public Employee Speech and the
Privatization of the First Amendment, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1, 40 (2013) (noting that bureaucracy in
government entities is intentional and “intrinsic to government work”).
78. Solove, supra note 62, at 1104 (Asserting that bureaucratic pressure results in “decisions
without adequate accountability, dangerous pockets of unfettered discretion, and choices based on
short-term goals without consideration of the long-term consequences or the larger social effects.”).
79. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 147–48. Compare Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 231–32 (the
Court preserved the public-private distinction by stating “[w]hether they may be employed by
competitors to penetrate trade secrets is not a question presented in this case. Governments do not
generally seek to appropriate trade secrets of the private-sector, and the right to be free of
appropriation of trade secrets is protected by law.”), with City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746,
759 (2010) (the Court did not explicitly reject the public-private analogy in the context of a
government workplace case, but noted that some states require employers, i.e., non-government
entities, to disclose surveillance of electronic communications).
80. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 180.
81. Id. at 187.
82. For example, security guards are non-government entities that have the ability to deprive
individuals of liberty. Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 49, 50 (2004).
83. For example, when financial institutions call to find out if a loan applicant has a terminal
illness, “privacy is violated in a manner about as consequential as if the same violations had been
carried out by a government agency.” Amitai Etzioni, The Privacy Merchants: What Is to Be
Done?, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 929, 934 (2012).
84. For example, Google Maps readily provides the public with access to satellite photos.
Kevin Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2321, 2344 (2007).
85. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 187. See Gerald Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in
American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1277, 1306 (2005) (“[C]orporate bureaucratic power, as it has
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Although Schwartz’s normative framework has the potential to
guide courts in deciding whether analogizing is appropriate, the
framework has its drawbacks. While Professor Schwartz provided
examples, courts must ultimately exercise heavy judicial discretion in
applying each factor. Because the factors are based on tradition rather
than distinctions drawn from legislation or precedent,86 courts lack
guidance in defining these factors, which results in a lack of
predictability for courts and NGEs.87 This is particularly salient for the
first factor, which is arguably the most prominent distinction between
government and NGEs. Although Schwartz defined the first factor as
“a combination of coercion, state power, and the monopoly features of
government,”88 a number of questions arise: What is meant by
coercion? What are specific monopolistic features of the government?
Moreover, Professor Schwartz noted that the most extreme form of
coercive power is the government’s ability to deprive the individual of
life or liberty,89 suggesting that coercive power operates on a
spectrum. This proves problematic if a court is faced with an NGE that
falls in the middle of the spectrum.
Because courts must exercise heavy judicial discretion in defining
and applying the four factors, the framework as a whole is
unpredictable and may aggravate the inconsistencies in data privacy
law. This is particularly relevant for NGEs. As stated above, courts do
not apply the Fourth Amendment to privacy cases against NGEs, but
instead rely on a variety of sources of law, including federal law, state
constitutions, state law, and FTC regulations—some of which do not
incorporate the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable expectation of
privacy test.90 If the court determined that analogizing was
emerged, has imposed a forceful objective restraint on the shareholders’ ability to govern the
corporation.”).
86. By way of analogy, Congress codified four factors in the fair use doctrine from copyright
law. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). These factors guide courts in deciding whether a defendant’s use
of a plaintiff’s copyrightable work is authorized. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S.
Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 551 (2008). Scholars note that,
notwithstanding this legislation and a rich body of precedent, courts define each factor
inconsistently. See Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform,
23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391 (2005).
87. Predictability in the rule of law is one of the highest priorities in the judicial system. Kem
Thompson Frost, Predictability in the Law, Prized Yet Not Promoted: A Study in Judicial Priorities,
67 BAYLOR L. REV. 48, 51 (2015).
88. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 174.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 151.
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appropriate, then NGEs may be subject to the Fourth Amendment
reasonable expectation of privacy test, which may be different from
the applicable laws that govern NGEs. This unpredictability may
discourage NGEs from developing and manufacturing products that
could affect the end user’s privacy, such as applications that integrate
the user’s geolocation information.
IV. GEOLOCATION INFORMATION
As a preliminary matter, geolocation information (“GI”) refers to
the specific locations of an electronic communications device, such as
a smartphone or a tablet.91 While GI may be generated in a few
different ways,92 the most relevant is the Global Positioning System
(“GPS”), which utilizes a system of satellites to accurately pinpoint
the location of a device.93 The U.S. Department of Defense initially
developed the GPS for military purposes in order to bolster national
security.94 This purpose became one of the four underlying policies of
the GPS, along with “effectively contribut[ing] to . . . public safety,
scientific, and economic interests of the U.S. . . .”95 Since its
inception, the GPS has been adopted in contexts outside the military,
such as driving navigation96 and agriculture.97 Furthermore, mobile
application developers have increasingly incorporated the GPS into
their applications to generate GI98 and unsurprisingly, a recent study

91. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 1011, 112th Cong.
(2011).
92. See In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 137 (E.D.N.Y.
2013) (noting that GI is generated through cell-site towers, the Global Positioning System, and
wireless routers).
93. See Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 414 (2007).
94. Aaron Renenger, Note, Satellite Tracking and the Right to Privacy, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 549,
550 (2002).
95. 51 U.S.C. § 50112 (2012).
96. Roads & Highways, GPS.GOV, http://www.gps.gov/applications/roads (last visited Mar.
18, 2017).
97. Agriculture, GPS.GOV, http://www.gps.gov/applications/agriculture (last visited Mar. 18,
2017).
98. Will Fulton, Five Great Location-Based Games That Aren’t Pokémon Go, DIG. TRENDS
(July 18, 2016, 11:27 AM), http://www.digitaltrends.com/gaming/best-location-based-gps-games/.
In February 2012, the FTC reported that many mobile applications that target children
automatically collect geolocation information. FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE APPS FOR KIDS:
CURRENT PRIVACY DISCLOSURES ARE DISAPPOINTING (Feb. 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites
/default/files/documents/reports/mobile-apps-kids-current-privacy-disclosures-aredisappointing/120216mobile_apps_kids.pdf.
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revealed that 90% of Americans use their smartphone for geolocationrelated purposes.99
A. The Government/Non-Government Dichotomy
Geolocation information is one example of the dichotomy
between the government and NGEs in data privacy law. Consequently,
the Fourth Amendment ensures protection against government privacy
intrusions. The Supreme Court recently confirmed this principle in a
case involving GI. In United States v. Jones, the government placed a
GPS device on defendant Jones’ vehicle and tracked his geolocation
for four weeks.100 The Supreme Court resolved the issue of whether
Jones’ Fourth Amendment right had been violated and held that
tracking Jones’ location via the GPS constituted a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.101 Therefore, Jones corroborates
that the Fourth Amendment indeed protects an individual’s GI against
government intrusions.
Because GI exemplifies this dichotomy, presumably an end user’s
GI is protected against NGE’s, such as technology companies and
mobile application developers. In Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info.
Network, Inc., the defendant media company developed and
distributed a news and entertainment mobile app.102 Each time the
plaintiff end user watched a video on the app, the defendant shared the
plaintiff’s GI with third party companies.103 The First Circuit held that
GI qualified as PII under the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988,
and the Act prohibits disclosing GI to third parties.104 Therefore, the
First Circuit confirmed that, at least under the Video Privacy
Protection Act, an end user’s GI is protected against NGEs, such as
mobile application developers.
B. The FTC’s Geolocation Privacy Concerns
The marriage between mobile applications and the GPS presents
an interesting paradox: While Google Maps efficiently delivers
99. Monica Anderson, More Americans Using Smartphones for Getting Directions, Streaming
TV, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/29/ussmartphone-use.
100. 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
101. Id. at 949.
102. 820 F.3d 482, 484 (1st Cir. 2016).
103. Id. at 485.
104. Id. at 489; see 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (2012).
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driving directions and Pokémon Go encourages social and physical
activity in the real world, this marriage allows an NGE to freely collect
and disclose GI virtually unopposed. An NGE’s freedom, according
to the FTC, raises four privacy concerns: (1) targeted advertising, (2)
stalking or physically harming the end user, (3) lack of end user’s
consent, and (4) hackers committing cybercrimes.
Underlying the first concern is the possibility that an NGE may
collect or disclose an end user’s GI for targeted advertising.105 By
collecting an end user’s aggregate GI, the NGE can build the end
user’s profile of recently visited locations.106 The NGE may use this
profile to target advertising to the end user through his or her device.107
The FTC also expressed the concern that an NGE may collect or
disclose this information to the end user’s detriment.108 Specifically, a
criminal may identify the end user’s current or future GI and use this
information to stalk or physically harm the end user.109 Moreover,
there is also the possibility that an NGE collects and discloses this
information without the end user’s express consent.110 This is
particularly troublesome if NGEs use or disclose the GI for
unspecified purposes, e.g., selling the information to the
government.111 Lastly, an NGE’s ability to collect and disclose an end
user’s GI may increase the possibility of a privacy breach.112
Specifically, a hacker may access the NGEs GI database to commit a
cybercrime, such as identity theft.113
C. The Stored Communications Act
Notwithstanding the FTC’s enumerated privacy concerns,
currently there is no federal legislation that expressly protects an end

105. The Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014: Hearing on S.2171 Before the Subcomm.
for Privacy, Tech. & the Law of the U.S. S. Comm. on the Judiciary, at 2–3 (June 4, 2014)
[hereinafter Senate Hearing] (prepared statement of the Federal Trade Commission),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/313671/140604locationprivacyact
.pdf; In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
106. Senate Hearing, supra note 105, at 2.
107. In re Smartphone, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 138.
108. Senate Hearing, supra note 105, at 2.
109. ISACA,
GEOLOCATION: RISKS, ISSUES AND STRATEGIES,
8
(2011),
http://www.isaca.org/groups/professional-english/wireless/groupdocuments/geolocation_wp.pdf.
110. Senate Hearing, supra note 105, at 3.
111. See Solove, supra note 62, at 1095.
112. Senate Hearing, supra note 105, at 2.
113. ISACA, supra note 109.
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user’s GI.114 Instead, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 presumably governs.115 While this Act consists of three titles, the
most relevant is Title II, known as the Stored Communications Act
(“SCA”). The SCA protects an end user’s stored electronic
communications (“SEC”)116 against a provider’s (NGE’s)
compelled117 and voluntary118 disclosure to the government. While the
SCA unambiguously regulates an NGE’s disclosure practices, it is
unclear whether the SCA protects GI generated from mobile
applications, such as Pokémon Go.
To qualify for SCA protection, as a threshold matter, GI must
qualify as an SEC. To qualify as an SEC, GI must be “temporar[ily
and] intermediate[ly]” stored by either: (1) an electronic
communication service (“ECS”), or (2) a remote computing service
(“RCS”).119 An ECS must allow end users to communicate.120 An
example is WhatsApp: a mobile application that allows end users to
communicate through a text message platform and share their
respective locations.121 If the end user chooses to share his or her
location, WhatsApp temporarily stores the user’s GI.122 An RCS, in
contrast, is an NGE that offers “computer storage or processing
services.”123 For example, Dropbox provides cloud storage for files,
such as documents and photos. If an end user opts to automatically
upload files from a smartphone, Dropbox tracks the smartphone’s GI
and restarts the upload when it detects a significant change in the
location.124 Therefore, Dropbox collects GI in order to process and

114. Jennifer Ann Urban, Has GPS Made the Adequate Enforcement of Privacy Laws in the
United States a Luxury of the Past?, 16 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 401, 414 (2016).
115. Christian Levis, Note, Smartphone, Dumb Regulations: Mixed Signals in Mobile Privacy,
22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 191, 204 (2011).
116. Storage Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012).
117. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide
to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1218 (2004); See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
118. Kerr, supra note 117; See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012).
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(a) (2012).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2012).
121. FAQ,
WHATSAPP,
https://www.whatsapp.com/faq/en/iphone/
20964587 (last visited Feb. 8, 2017).
122. WhatsApp Legal Info, WHATSAPP, https://www.whatsapp.com/legal/#terms-of-service
(last visited Feb. 8, 2017).
123. 18 U.S.C.§ 2711(2) (2012).
124. Background Uploading—Why the Dropbox iOS App Needs Location Data, DROPBOX,
https://www.dropbox.com/en/help/209 (last visited Feb. 8, 2017).
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upload files.125 Because WhatsApp and Dropbox qualify as an ECS
and RCS, respectively, the SCA governs their disclosure practices.
The SCA, however, does not protect Pokémon Go players.
Assuming that a Pokémon Go player’s GI is “temporar[ily and]
intermediate[ly]”126 stored, Niantic is not an ECS because Pokémon
Go players cannot directly communicate with each other through the
application itself. Nor does Niantic qualify as an RCS because it does
not collect and store a player’s GI merely for storage or processing
services. Consequently, the SCA does not protect Pokémon Go
players and end users of other mobile applications that integrate GI in
a similar manner. Rather, these end users are only entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection against the government.127
V. THE PROPOSED LOCATION PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT
As stated in Part I, Pokémon Go, and more generally AR,
demonstrate an NGE’s uninhibited ability to collect, store, and
disclose an end user’s GI to third parties without consent.
While current federal legislation does not regulate this ability,128
the Location Privacy Protection Act (“LPPA”) proposes to bridge this
gap by prohibiting NGEs from collecting or disclosing end users’ GI
without consent, absent an exception.129
This Note identifies legislative gaps in the LPPA and
recommends appropriate amendments (collectively “amended
LPPA”) in hopes of accomplishing three goals. First, this Note ensures
that the amended LPPA protects an end user’s geolocation privacy in
light of the FTC’s concerns. Today, technology companies, like
mobile application developers, capitalize on new technologies, such
as AR. Without much thought, end users give in to these technologies
for convenience or mere entertainment. These users, however, may not
realize that these companies may freely collect, store, and disclose
their GI to undisclosed third parties for undisclosed purposes. This
creates an information asymmetry between companies and end users
that, according to the FTC, raises four privacy concerns: specifically

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(a) (2012).
Kerr, supra note 117, at 1213.
Urban, supra note 114, at 414.
Location Privacy Protection Act, S. 2270, 114th Cong. § 2713 (2015).
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targeting advertisements at end users;130 physically harming end
users;131 collecting end users’ GI without consent,132 and; hackers
committing cybercrimes against end users.133
This Note also ensures that the amended LPPA remains consistent
with the policies underlying the GPS. The LPPA’s first and foremost
concern is protecting an end user’s privacy over GI. Although this
right is important, it must be balanced against the policies of national
security, public safety, scientific interests, and economic interests134
that underlie the system that generates GI.
While the ultimate goal of the amended LPPA is to protect an end
user’s GI in light of privacy and policy concerns, the amended LPPA
also promotes predictability for courts and NGEs alike by prescribing
bright line rules. Professor Schwartz noted that courts arbitrarily
decide when to analogize between government and non-government
privacy violations,135 and proposed a four-factor framework to
determine whether such analogies are appropriate.136 This framework,
however, requires heavy judicial discretion in defining and applying
each factor. The solution must be legislative. The amended LPPA
reduces the judicial discretion that Professor Schwartz’s framework
sought to counteract by expressly identifying what NGEs can and
cannot do with an end user’s GI.
A. Interpretation
Minnesota Senator Al Franken introduced the LPPA to amend the
Electronics Communications Privacy Act. This Note focuses on five
provisions of the LPPA: (1) the general prohibition, (2) exceptions, (3)
the stalking and domestic violence provision, (4) the publication
requirement, and (5) enforcement.
First, the LPPA generally prohibits a non-government individual
or entity (“covered entity”) from knowingly collecting or disclosing
an end user’s GI without express consent.137 In isolation, this provision

130. Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 105; In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application,
977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
131. Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 105.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 51 U.S.C. § 50112 (2012).
135. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 147–48.
136. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 187.
137. Location Privacy Protection Act, S. 2270, 114th Cong. § 2713(b)(1) (2015).

[CORRECTED] (10)50.4_MARTINEZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

PROTECTING GEOLOCATION PRIVACY

3/13/19 6:18 PM

731

undoubtedly protects the end user’s geolocation privacy. Notably, this
provision is silent on a covered entity’s ability to store an end user’s
GI. This ability, however, is implied because the LPPA does not
require a covered entity to disclose the information within a specified
period of time after initially collecting the information. Because a
covered entity may store the information in perpetuity, this ability can
be read into the statute. Therefore, the LPPA requires consent to
collect, store, and disclose the end user’s GI.
The LPPA also enumerates nine exceptions that allow a covered
entity to collect and disclose an end user’s GI without consent. The
relevant exceptions may be classified into the following categories:
(1) disclosure to a parent or guardian locating a minor, a ward, or a
legally incompetent person; (2) disclosure for other emergency
purposes; (3) disclosure pursuant to a court order or for law
enforcement purposes; (4) disclosure to operate a network; (5)
necessary disclosure to another person for any of the previously
mentioned exceptions; (6) disclosure to protect the NGE’s property,
its customers, or another entity from unlawful conduct, and; (7)
disclosure to any other covered entity that did not initially collect
information from the end user’s device.138
Moreover, the LPPA’s stalking and domestic violence provision
prohibits the knowing and willful disclosure of an end user’s GI to
another covered entity for these purposes.139 The LPPA also imposes
a fine, imprisonment for a maximum of two years, or both, regardless
of the end user’s consent.140
Additionally, the LPPA requires a covered entity to publish its
privacy policy on a website. This policy must include the purpose of
collection and disclosure, the specific non-governmental recipients of
disclosure, and the end user’s ability to revoke consent.141 This
provision, however, only governs a covered entity that collects GI
from at least 1,000 devices in a year.142
Lastly, the LPPA provides the means of enforcing its provisions.
The enforcement provision requires the Attorney General to work with

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. § 2713(b)(2).
Id. § 2266(a).
Id. § 2266(b).
Id. § 2713(b)(4).
Id.
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the FTC to “issue regulations to implement the requirements of this
regulation.”143
B. Legislative Gaps and Recommendations
1. The LPPA’s Silence on Storage
The LPPA undoubtedly regulates a covered entity’s ability to
collect and disclose an end user’s GI. Consequently, the LPPA does
not explicitly address an NGE’s ability to store an end user’s GI, but
this ability is implied. Since the LPPA does not regulate storage
practices, an NGE can store an end user’s GI in perpetuity.
Perhaps the LPPA drafters intended to defer to the Stored
Communications Act. This is plausible considering that the SCA
immediately precedes the proposed LPPA. It is unlikely, however, that
the drafters intended to defer to the SCA because the LPPA only
modifies Section 2702(c) of the SCA, which regulates a provider’s
(NGE’s) ability to voluntarily disclose a subscriber’s information.144
Therefore, the LPPA’s modification only applies to a provider’s
disclosure practices, which does not address the provider’s storage
practices.
Even if the drafters intended to defer to the SCA, the SCA does
not adequately address an NGE’s ability to store an end user’s GI. As
stated above, the SCA only protects a “temporar[ily and]
“intermediate[ly]” stored electronic communication.145 Assuming that
GI qualifies as an SEC, the next and more important issue is whether
the SCA limits an NGE’s ability to store an end user’s GI. The SCA
only regulates a provider’s (NGE’s) compelled146 and voluntary147
disclosure to the government. The SCA, therefore, only regulates an
NGE’s disclosure practices and is virtually silent on storage practices.
Because of this silence, the only viable solution is to amend the
proposed LPPA.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. § 2713(c)(1).
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(a) (2012).
Kerr, supra note 117, at 1218. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
Kerr, supra note 117, at 1218. 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012).
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2. Recommended Amendments
The recommended solution is three-fold: (1) amend the general
prohibition; (2) add the storage limit provision,148 and; (3) amend the
publication provision.
First, the general prohibition should be amended to reflect a
covered entity’s ability to store the end user’s GI. Accordingly, this
provision should read: “Except as provided in paragraph (2), a covered
entity may not knowingly collect, store, or disclose to another covered
entity the geolocation information from an electronic communications
device without the consent of the individual that is using the electronic
communications device.”149
Next, the LPPA should include a provision that imposes a time
limit on storing an end user’s GI. This storage limit provision should
read: “A covered entity who collects the geolocation information from
an electronic communications device may store such information for
X amount of time.”
The publication provision should be amended to better inform the
end user of the covered entity’s storage practices. This provision
should read: “A covered entity that collects the geolocation
information . . . shall maintain a publicly accessible Internet website
that includes . . . the amount of time it intends to store the end user’s
geolocation information pursuant to the time limit imposed in [the
second recommended amendment].”
Unlike the preceding provisions, the enforcement provision
should not be amended because it clearly and unambiguously
delegates enforcement to the Attorney General and the FTC. Even in
the absence of this provision or other federal legislation, the FTC
publicly supported the LPPA’s initiatives and vowed to continue to
enforce privacy violations against NGEs.150 Because the enforcement
provision simply formalizes what the FTC has vowed to do, this
provision should remain status quo.

148. The drafters of the LPPA did not hesitate to draw bright line rules. For example, Section
2713(b)(4) only requires publication if the covered entity collects GI from at least 1,000 electronic
communications devices.
149. Location Privacy Protection Act, S. 2270, 114th Cong. § 2713(b)(1) (2015).
150. Senate Hearing, supra note 105, at 12.
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C. Justifications
The amended LPPA first and foremost seeks to protect an end
user’s geolocation privacy. This section demonstrates that the
amended LPPA accomplishes this goal in light of the FTC’s
enumerated privacy concerns and the policies underlying the GPS,
with the added benefit of promoting predictability in data privacy law.
1. The FTC’s Privacy Concerns
The FTC articulated four concerns associated with GI: (1)
targeted advertising, (2) stalking or physical harm, (3) lack of an end
user’s consent, and (4) hackers committing cybercrimes. This section
determines whether the amended LPPA addresses these concerns.
First, the FTC articulated a concern regarding an NGE’s use of an
end user’s GI for targeted advertising without consent.151 None of the
LPPA’s exceptions allow collection or disclosure for targeted
advertising. This purpose is unnecessary for locating a minor or
incompetent person, other emergencies, for law enforcement
purposes, or out of necessity. Nor is disclosure required to protect the
NGE, its customers, or other NGEs. Notably, the last exception allows
a third party’s collection or disclosure if the third party did not conduct
the initial collection. Thus, the third party must lawfully acquire this
information from a covered entity under one of the previous
exceptions. Because these exceptions apply to a targeted end user in
limited circumstances, it is very unlikely that the covered entity will
disclose a significant proportion of user GI to a third party.
Consequently, the ambitious third party must rely on collecting an end
user’s GI individually. Requiring collection on an individual basis
imposes high transactional costs that are likely to deter the third party.
Therefore, the proposed LPPA addresses the targeted advertising
concern.
The FTC also noted the possibility that an NGE may collect an
end user’s GI to locate and/or harm the user.152 Two of the LPPA’s
provisions directly address this concern. The necessity exception
allows an NGE to collect or disclose GI if it is necessary to protect the
end user from unlawful conduct. This provision affirmatively protects
the end user from physical harm. The stalking and domestic violence
151. Senate Hearing, supra note 105; In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F.
Supp. 2d 129, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
152. Senate Hearing, supra note 105.
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provision prohibits an NGE’s disclosure to stalk or commit domestic
violence against the end user.153 This provision also imposes criminal
penalties to deter such conduct.154 Because the LPPA allows
disclosure to prevent harm and criminalizes such use for stalking or
domestic violence purposes, the LPPA addresses the FTC’s second
concern.
The FTC also recognized that an NGE may collect an end user’s
GI without the end user knowing.155 The policies underlying this
concern are transparency, allowing the end user to make betterinformed decisions, and preventing unfair or deceptive practices.156 A
few of the LPPA’s provisions address this concern. The LPPA’s
general prohibition requires the end user’s consent for collection.
Coupled with the publication requirement, the end user has ample
access to the covered entity’s GI collection practices. These
requirements may provide the end user with actual knowledge of—or
at least make it more likely that the end user has knowledge of—the
covered entity’s data practices.157 The LPPA’s exceptions allow
collection or disclosure without the end user’s express consent in very
limited circumstances. The underlying policies for these exceptions
outweigh the end user’s geolocation privacy. For instance, the first
category of exceptions exhibits a strong policy of protecting minors
and legally incapacitated persons. The legal purposes exception
promotes the policy of assisting law enforcement to protect the general
public. The necessity exception, as described above, protects the end
user from harm. It is clear that the LPPA does not afford the individual
the absolute right to privacy, but rather, balances this right with strong
public policies. Notwithstanding these exceptions, the LPPA
addresses the FTC’s third concern.
Lastly, the FTC articulated the possibility of hackers accessing an
end user’s GI to commit a cybercrime, such as identity theft.158 At the
153. Location Privacy Protection Act, S. 2270, 114th Cong. § 2266(a) (2015).
154. Id. § 2266(b).
155. Senate Hearing, supra note 105.
156. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012).
157. This assumption breaks down considering that most end users consent to privacy policies
without reading them. Amanda Grannis, Note, You Didn’t Even Notice! Elements of Effective
Online Privacy Policies, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1109, 1154 (2015); see Sarah Gordon, Privacy:
A Study of Attitudes and Behaviors in U.S., U.K. and E.U. Information Security Professionals,
SYMANTEC
SECURITY
RESPONSE
WHITE
PAPER
12
(2003),
https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/privacy.attitudes.behaviors.pdf.
158. Senate Hearing, supra note 105.
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heart of this concern are an NGE’s storage practices. If an NGE did
not store an end user’s GI, there would be absolutely no risk of a
privacy breach because there would be nowhere to steal the
information from. While the NGE’s ability to store an end user’s GI
may be implied from the general prohibition provision, none of the
LPPA’s provisions regulate this practice. The recommended storage
limit provision bridges this gap and prevents NGEs from perpetually
storing an end user’s GI. A defined time limit restricts the amount of
time for hackers to unlawfully access this information, and thus,
reduces the opportunity for a privacy breach.159 Therefore, in reducing
this opportunity, the LPPA and the recommended amendments
address the FTC’s final concern.
Although the preceding provisions address the FTC’s enumerated
privacy concerns, these provisions are meaningless without
enforcement. The LPPA’s enforcement provision unambiguously
delegates the role of enforcement to the Attorney General and the
FTC. Therefore, the amended LPPA addresses the FTC’s privacy
concerns associated with GI.
2. GPS Policies
As stated above, the amended LPPA intends to protect the end
user’s right to privacy over his or her GI. This right, however, must be
balanced against the policies underlying the very system that generates
GI: the Global Positioning System. These policies include: (1) national
security, (2) public safety, (3) scientific interests, and (4) economic
interests.160
The U.S. Department of Defense originally developed the GPS
for military purposes to bolster national security.161 In its current state,
the LPPA does not directly address national security concerns, such as
the potential that databases consisting of end user information will be
hacked.162 By requiring covered entities to obtain consent before
collection and disclosure, the end user ultimately decides whether to
159. Notably, it may not be feasible to completely eliminate the possibility of a privacy breach
because the only solution is to prevent NGEs from collecting and storing an end user’s GI. The
LPPA’s exceptions, however, underscore important countervailing policies that weigh in favor of
collection and storage.
160. 51 U.S.C. § 50112 (2012).
161. Renenger, supra note 94, at 550.
162. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Cyberattack the Next Pearl Harbor?, 18 N.C. J. L. & TECH.
233 (2016).
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contribute his or her GI to this database. The end user’s decision
directly impacts national security by influencing the size of the
database or the potential hacking target. The recommended storage
limit provision directly promotes national security because a time limit
minimizes the time frame for an entity—whether foreign or local—to
hack into a covered entity’s database of GI. Therefore, the amended
LPPA promotes the policy of national security.
The amended LPPA must also be considered in light of the public
safety policy. The most relevant LPPA portions are the necessity
exception and the stalking and domestic violence provision. The
necessity exception allows an NGE to collect or disclose GI if it is
necessary to protect the end user from unlawful conduct. The LPPA
allows such use to protect the end user or his or her property from
harm. Moreover, the stalking and domestic violence provision
explicitly prohibits disclosure to stalk or commit domestic violence
against an end user. This provision also imposes criminal penalties.
On a superficial level, these provisions only protect the end user. But
considering that most individuals use mobile applications that require
collecting GI, the LPPA protects a significant portion of the
population.163 Therefore, the LPPA promotes the policy of public
safety.
The amended LPPA must also be balanced against the scientific
interests of the U.S. In the geolocation context, this refers to
researching and developing GPS technology.164 While the amended
LPPA does not directly address this policy, it limits covered entities’
collection, storage, and disclosure practices. Broadly, these limitations
exhibit Congress’s power to restrict how covered entities use the
information the GPS generates. Because these limitations may
discourage technology companies from developing GPS technology,
the amended LPPA has the potential to impede scientific progress.
These limitations, however, may promote efficiency in scientific
progress by providing clear rules for technology companies to follow.
Therefore, while the amended LPPA does not directly address
scientific interests, it may obstruct or promote this policy.
The final policy to consider is the economic interests of the U.S.
The underlying concern is that the amended LPPA chills researching
163. Anderson, supra note 99.
164. See 10 U.S.C. § 2281(b) (2012) (expanding how GPS may be applied for transportation
and other civilian purposes).
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and developing GI because it unduly burdens covered entities. This is
a distinct possibility, particularly if covered entities have a financial
stake in the GI itself. On the contrary, the amended LPPA could be
framed as bright line rules that promote competition. By requiring all
covered entities to abide by the same rules, covered entities may be
incentivized to think outside the box and invest in other creative and
productive ventures that place goods on the market for public
consumption. This consumption will contribute to the economy and,
therefore, the LPPA and the recommended amendments promote the
policy of economic interests. Taken together, the amended LPPA
promotes each policy underlying the GPS.
3. Predictability
One of the greatest criticisms of U.S. data privacy jurisprudence
is its unpredictable nature, which arises from the fragmented
enforcement structure. The LPPA represents a shift in remedying this
structure in two ways. First, as a federal bill, the LPPA casts a wide
net in regulating an NGE’s GI collection, storage, and disclosure
practices at both the federal and state level.
Second, the amended LPPA effectively eliminates the current
heavy judicial discretion165 by providing courts with bright line rules.
The amended general prohibition provision and recommended
amendment explicitly require an NGE to obtain consent before
collecting, storing, and disclosing an end user’s GI. The LPPA’s
enumerated exceptions allow these practices without an end user’s
consent in limited, unambiguous circumstances. The storage limit
provision specifies the maximum amount of time a non-government
entity may store the information. The amended publication
requirement lists the types of information the NGE must include in its
privacy policy. The enforcement provision delegates the enforcement
to the Attorney General and the FTC. In tandem, these provisions
provide bright line rules, leaving minimal room for interpretation, and
therefore, promote predictability for courts and NGEs alike.
D. Caveats
While this Note narrowly focuses on the amended LPPA and an
NGE’s storage practices in light of numerous privacy and policy
165. Schwartz, supra note 62, at 147–48.
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considerations, it leaves a several areas unexplored. First, this Note
only focuses on select provisions of the LPPA. These provisions,
however, are most relevant for the narrow purpose of this Note, which
is to address an NGE’s storage practices. Notably, this omission does
not undermine the importance of the other provisions.
This Note does not address how an NGE may store an end user’s
GI. The how refers to the mechanics surrounding the NGE’s storage
practices, including its ability to contract third parties. This how issue
concerns the NGE’s direct relationship with third parties. While this
indirectly affects the end user, this only focuses on the direct
relationship between the NGE and the end user. Notwithstanding that
the how issue is beyond the scope of this Note, it may be an important
area for future legislation to regulate.
VI. CONCLUSION
Today’s digital landscape presents novel technologies that pose
practical difficulties for protecting an individual’s right to privacy. In
part, this is due to the subtle complexities of such technologies. An
example is augmented reality. AR is convenient because it eliminates
the need for an intermediary device by providing information directly
to the user. In the context of Pokémon Go, however, the application
developer requires players’ consent to collect, store, and disclose their
GI to undisclosed third parties. Although a lawsuit has not yet been
filed, policy makers and interest groups alike have expressed concerns
over the privacy implications arising from Pokémon Go. Therefore,
the underlying issue is whether the law adequately protects an end
user’s GI against non-government entities, such as mobile application
developers.
As the law stands, the answer is an emphatic no. The law clearly
protects an individual’s right to privacy against the government. An
end user’s privacy from a non-government entity, however, is limited.
Currently, non-government entities may freely collect, store, and
disclose an end user’s geolocation information without consent.
Although the Location Privacy Protection Act proposes to bridge this
gap, it is unclear if the Act imposes a time limit on storing this
information. This Note recommends legislative amendments to the
federal bill to address storage practices in light of privacy and policy
concerns. Additionally, these amendments serve to guide lawmakers
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in enacting bright line rules of law to promote predictability, of which
privacy law has been sorely lacking.
That technology develops more quickly than the law adapts is one
of the realities that policymakers, judges, and lawyers alike face in
today’s world. But, reality and technology aside, this should not
diminish an individual’s right to privacy in the real or digital world.

